The memo is the tip of a growing iceberg of evidence that Bush planned to go to war with Iraq long before his administration publicly stated its case. More importantly, the memo points to the fact that the intelligence to go to war was fabricated and that Congress and the American public were lied to.

It is now an accepted fact that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that the intelligence leading up to the war was bad. The failure of intelligence and the failure to find WMD’s is blamed on the intelligence community, primarily the CIA.

However, before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Congress and the American people were told a series of falsehood and lies 1. Aluminum artillery tubes were misdiagnosed as part of a centrifuge to refine uranium. 2. Forgeries alleging Iraqi attempts to obtain yellow cake uranium in Africa were circulated. 3. Tall tales about mobile biological weapons laboratories from a drunken defector named “Curveball” were accepted as fact. 4. Bogus warnings that Iraqi forces could fire WMD-tipped missiles within 45 minutes of an order to do so were used to incite a threat of imminent danger to great effect, particularly in the British Parliment.

The false information was presented by the established media as fact in a howl of hysteria, exploiting the fear of 9/11. When the information was found to be wrong as in the case of the aluminum tubes and false documents about yellow cake uranium in Africa, the mainstream media did little to correct it.

Now, this new evidence points to a clearly impeachable offense i.e. falsifying intelligence and lying to Congress in order to take the United States into an illegal war. Despite this fact, the memo has received minimal coverage in the American press.

The tendency in the media has been to view the memo in the context of other statements by critics of the administration and not as hard evidence of an impeachable crime. The memo is not the product of some pundit’s opinion, however. It is the product of one of the most highly regarded intelligence gathering organizations in the world and it was presented BEFORE the war. Despite this fact, the memo and its implications are being ignored.

The political reaction to the memo in the U.S. has also been downplayed. On May 26, 2005, eighty-eight members of Congress headed by Rep John Conyers (D)-Mich.sent two letters to the White House asking for an explanation about the memo or at least a response. The response has not been forth coming

The media coverage for Conyers and his Congressional colleagues has echoed the stony silence from the White House.

Locally, Doug Turner the Buffalo News Washington reporter has followed the lead of the majority of daily newspapers and has not written about the memo or its implications as evidence pointing to high crime and misdemeanors. Like the majority of beltway reporters, he has remained silent.

The Hamilton Spectator, to our north in Ontario has been only daily paper in the region to publish an article about the Downing Street memo.

We at Alt Press have been late in getting this issue out and as a result we’ve been sitting on the story for the past two weeks and yet, it still remains fresh news. We take the fable about the tortoise and the hare to heart, but this is ridiculous!

The mainstream media seems to view a political crime from the perspective of the age old quandary: “If a tree falls in the forest and nobody is around to hear it, does it make a sound?” While they ponder this problem, people continue to die in Iraq, and yet no one is accountable.

In this increasingly surreal American political landscape, a President is more likely to get impeached for lying about a sexual affair than starting war that has taken the lives of 1800 Americans and tens of thousands of Iraqis. The French term for orgasm is “le petit mort,” which means “little death.” They also have a term for the overthrow of a government: “coup d’etat.” We’ve exchanged the little death of Bill Clinton for a lot of death in Iraq. And as Bush’s Christian soldiers march against virtually every democratic institution in this country, don’t be surprised if our state winds up being cut to death.

It was a few forlorn cries in the media wilderness that made Watergate, & Monica into “crimes.” The result: two president confounded impeachment. One over an attack on a political opponent and the cover-up, the other because of an illicit affair.

We have a society that appears be having a “coney island of the mind” as the news of a sexual affair is more likely to get a sitting president impeached than falsifying intelligence, lying to congress, and starting an illegal war costing tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars.

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING From: Matthew RycroftDate: 23 July 2002S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair CampbellIRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq. This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons. ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition. (iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force. The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work. On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary. The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN. John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions: (a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options. (b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation. (c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week. (d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam. He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states. (e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update. (f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.) MATTHEW RYCROFT By Joe Schmidbauer

On May 1, 2005, the Sunday London Times published what has been called the “Downing St. Memo.” The memo documents the official minutes of a briefing by Richard Dearlove, then head of Britain's MI-6. MI-6 is the intelligence service of the British government. Returning to London after consultations in Washington, Dearlove briefed Prime Minister Blair and his top national security officials on July 23, 2002, about the Bush administration's plans to make war on Iraq.

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